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Income Inequality, Progressive 
Taxation, and Tax Expenditures
James R. Hines Jr.
University of Michigan and NBER
There are important and growing concerns about income inequality 
in the United States and other high-income countries. These concerns 
refl ect rising apprehension about the political and social consequences 
of inequality and worries that the advance of technology, expanding 
international trade and investment, and other economic developments 
may have signifi cantly widened income gaps in recent decades and will 
continue to do so in the future. In the United States, these concerns have 
prompted renewed calls for political activism and vigorous searches for 
policy measures that might improve the relative economic positions of 
low- and middle-income Americans. 
There are many ways in which government policies can and do 
infl uence the distribution of income, though redistributive policies can 
be costly from the standpoint of economic effi  ciency and growth. Since 
as a realistic matter it is unlikely that feasible reforms to any one indi-
vidual government program would fully address current income distri-
bution concerns, it is useful to consider a range of policy options and 
their likely eff ects on the distribution of income and the performance 
of the economy. It is particularly valuable to identify measures that 
address distributional concerns effi  ciently.
This chapter considers the design of a tax system in an economy 
with signifi cant income inequality, focusing on the impact of provi-
sions—such as tax deductions and tax credits—that off er benefi ts to 
some but not all taxpayers. Taxation directly aff ects the distribution of 
after-tax incomes by imposing larger burdens on some than it does on 
others, and it indirectly aff ects the distribution of income through the 
government programs it fi nances. A tax program designed to address 
income distribution concerns is one that imposes burdens based on abil-
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ity to pay and that guarantees adequate funding for appropriate govern-
ment programs; consequently, tax reforms can be evaluated based on the 
extent to which they permit the tax system to perform these functions.
The U.S. federal income tax imposes tax burdens based largely on 
ability to pay. The U.S. tax system is progressive, meaning that a tax-
payer’s burden measured as a percentage of income generally rises with 
income. The U.S. tax system achieves this progressivity largely with 
tax rates that increase with income and with the provision of refundable 
tax credits to low-income working families. As a result, most of the 
revenue raised by the U.S. federal income tax comes from high-income 
taxpayers, with a sizable portion of the income-earning U.S. population 
paying zero or negative federal income taxes.
Despite the progressivity of the U.S. income tax, there are fre-
quently voiced concerns that the system aff ords too many unwarranted 
tax breaks, particularly for high-income taxpayers.1 These concerns are 
understandable but misplaced. They are understandable because much 
of the popular discussion of tax policy focuses on apparent inequities 
created by the availability of tax preferences for which certain taxpay-
ers and not others are eligible. For example, only those taxpayers who 
itemize their tax deductions are able to receive tax reductions due to 
mortgage payments, charitable contributions, and state and local tax 
payments. Prior to passage of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, only 
about 30 percent of the taxpaying population chose to itemize deduc-
tions, with the remaining 70 percent claiming the standard deduction 
instead.2 Since the 30 percent who itemized their deductions were 
concentrated among high-income taxpayers, it follows that this high-
income group received most of the benefi ts of the favorable federal tax 
treatment of mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and 
local tax payments. By increasing the standard deduction, the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act signifi cantly reduced the number of U.S. taxpayers claim-
ing the standard deduction, and in the process it further concentrated 
the benefi ts of tax deductions among the wealthy. Hence, a simple cal-
culation of the distribution of the benefi ts of itemized deductions might 
conclude that the provision of these deductions reduces tax equity by 
providing benefi ts almost entirely to taxpayers with high incomes.
On closer examination, it becomes apparent that equity-based con-
cerns about these tax preferences are misplaced, because in fact tax 
preferences are critical features of progressive tax systems—and indeed, 
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are what make it possible for tax systems to exhibit high degrees of 
progressivity, with all the social benefi ts that are associated with pro-
gressivity. There are two reasons for this, the fi rst of which is that tax 
preferences make it possible to design taxes effi  ciently, since by provid-
ing preferential taxation of highly responsive activities it is possible to 
diff erentiate taxes in a way that is less costly to the economy. The eco-
nomic distortions associated with high tax rates are important consid-
erations in limiting the extent of taxation and tax progressivity, both in 
theory and in practice. Since high marginal tax rates discourage income 
production, the cost of imposing high tax rates rises with the degree 
to which economic activity is sensitive to taxation. Governments can 
choose to off er tax preferences for activities that are highly sensitive 
to taxation, which subjects these activities to lower eff ective tax rates, 
and thereby subjects relatively insensitive activities to comparatively 
higher rates of taxation. This type of tax design reduces the effi  ciency 
cost of high tax rates and thereby makes it feasible to implement a more 
progressive tax system.
The second reason tax preferences facilitate tax progressivity is that 
properly designed tax preferences adjust tax burdens according to abil-
ity to pay, which increases the attractiveness of imposing a highly pro-
gressive tax-rate structure. One of the important equity concerns about 
high degrees of tax progressivity is that high tax rates may be unduly 
burdensome to taxpayers in certain circumstances. For example, even 
a very-high-income taxpayer may fi nd it impossible or infeasible also 
to pay federal income taxes at high rates if simultaneously confronted 
with a combination of extraordinary medical bills, high state taxes, 
high alimony payments, and other claims on resources. The adoption 
of sympathetic tax treatment in the form of deductions for medical and 
other expenses makes legislators and the general public more willing 
than they would otherwise be to impose high tax rates on those with 
very high incomes.
As a result, an equitable tax system has a relatively narrow tax base 
and high tax rates, with rates that increase sharply with income. By 
applying high tax rates to affl  uent taxpayers, the system can raise rev-
enue that more than compensates for revenue lost from tax deductions 
and tax credits, and that has desirable distributional properties in the bar-
gain. Such a system off ers favorable rates, refundable credits, and other 
tax benefi ts for low-income families. The tax system thereby imposes 
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tax burdens according to ability to pay and raises revenue suffi  cient to 
fund needed government programs. By imposing burdens according to 
ability to pay and in off ering a sound system of government fi nance, a 
tax system with high rates and appropriate deductions and tax credits 
automatically addresses the income-distribution concerns that appropri-
ately motivate much of the current tax-policy discussion.
There is an alternative to such a system: it is a much more stripped-
down income tax that off ers very few if any deductions and tax credits. 
There is considerable popular appeal to such a broad-based, low-rate 
tax system, due in part to its simplicity and in part to the low rates. The 
archetypal broad-based, low-rate tax system is known as a Haig-Simons 
income tax, after the fundamental contributions of Robert Murray Haig 
(1921) and Henry Calvert Simons (1938). In the Haig-Simons income 
tax, all income is subject to taxation, without provision of deductions or 
tax credits corresponding to individual taxpayer situations. The virtue 
of such simplicity is not to be lightly dismissed, but this form of sim-
plicity comes at the cost of considerable loss of tax equity, because such 
a tax fails to accommodate individual circumstances, and it is unreal-
istic to think that a Haig-Simons income tax would ever be imposed at 
highly progressive rates. Indeed, even the appeal to low tax rates imme-
diately reveals that there is a limit to the range of possible tax progres-
sivity, which limits the extent to which those who are best positioned 
to pay taxes ultimately do so. Those who advocate for broad-based, 
low-rate tax systems frequently fail to recognize the intimate connec-
tion between the breadth of the tax base and the extent to which the 
government is able to adopt a system that taxes according to ability to 
pay. The purpose of this chapter is to draw attention to this connection, 
and to recommend that the United States and other countries do more to 
tailor their tax systems in ways that make them more progressive.
DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES OF THE U.S. 
INCOME TAX
The U.S. federal government collects revenue from several sources, 
of which two are by far the most important: 1) employment-related pay-
roll taxes, which fi nance Social Security and Medicare, and 2) the per-
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sonal income tax, which fi nances most of the rest of the government.3 
This paper focuses on the income tax, which is the primary discretion-
ary source of revenue for the federal government—and which by its 
nature is the part of the revenue system that is most amenable to the 
imposition of burdens according to ability to pay. U.S. payroll taxes 
are unlike income and other taxes in that eligibility for retirement ben-
efi ts, disability insurance, and medical insurance requires payment of 
employment taxes—whereas receipt of other federal benefi ts are not 
conditional on paying income taxes. For example, workers who have 
higher wage and salary income, and therefore pay greater Social Secu-
rity taxes, receive higher monthly benefi ts from the Social Security sys-
tem when they retire. Furthermore, the Social Security system provides 
benefi ts in a highly progressive way, with income replacement rates 
that are much higher at low incomes than they are at higher incomes. 
Consequently, the Social Security system achieves its distributional 
objectives not through its tax features but instead through its benefi t 
formula—which would make any distributional examination of Social 
Security taxes incomplete, given the close connection of Social Secu-
rity taxes and benefi ts.
U.S. federal income-tax burdens rise with income, largely refl ect-
ing the progressive nature of tax rates. The latest available data cover 
pre-2018 federal law, with Table 7.1 presenting calculations for tax year 
2014. In that year, an adjusted gross income of $465,600 put a taxpayer 
in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, and such taxpayers faced 
average tax rates of 27.2 percent. This top 1 percent of the U.S. income 
distribution had 20.6 percent of aggregate U.S. personal income that 
year and paid 39.5 percent of total federal income taxes. An adjusted 
gross income of $189,000 put a taxpayer in the top 5 percent of the 
income distribution; and this group faced average tax rates of 23.6 per-
cent, earned 36 percent of aggregate U.S. personal income that year, 
and paid 60 percent of federal income taxes. By contrast, the half of the 
United States that had incomes below $38,200 faced average tax rates 
of just 3.5 percent, had only 11.3 percent of personal income, and paid 
just 3.5 percent of federal income taxes.
Federal personal-income tax burdens in 2014 (and in other years) 
rise with income levels. This is largely the product of tax rates that 
increase with income, exempt amounts, and standard and personal 
deductions that permit taxpayers to earn signifi cant income before it 
150   Hines
becomes taxable, as well as refundable tax credits available to low-
income earners. In 2014, a married couple was not taxable until its 
income exceeded amounts covered by exemptions and deductions, and 
then was initially taxable at just 10 percent for the fi rst $18,150 of net 
taxable income. Such a couple then faced a 15 percent tax rate until its 
taxable income reached $73,800, after which point the marginal tax rate 
became 25 percent. The marginal income-tax rate rose to 28 percent at 
an income of $148,851, 33 percent at an income of $226,851, 35 percent 
at an income of $405,101, and 39.6 percent on any portion of income 
exceeding $457,601. Furthermore, the Earned Income Tax Credit and 
the Child Tax Credit were available primarily for low-income families.
Despite the evident progressivity of the federal income tax, it is pos-
sible for tax reform to make the system much more progressive than it 
was in 2014 or is today. One aspect of federal taxation that is commonly 
argued to work against tax progressivity is the provision of exclusions, 
deductions, and tax credits, all of which are commonly called “tax 
expenditures” (Surrey 1973). The most important single “tax expendi-
ture” is the tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance. Other 
signifi cant tax expenditures include the preferential treatment of retire-
ment accounts; deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage inter-
est, and charitable contributions; the favorable tax treatment of capital 
Table 7.1  Income Distribution, Tax Rates, and Tax Payments, 2014
Income 
groups (%)








Top 1 465.6 27.2 20.6 39.5
Top 5 189.0 23.6 36.0 60.0
Top 10 133.4 21.3 47.2 70.9
Top 25 77.7 17.8 68.9 86.8
Top 50 38.2 15.5 88.7 97.3
Bottom 50 3.5 11.3 3.5
NOTE: The table presents average federal income tax rates, total incomes, and total 
federal income tax payments by six income groups for tax year 2014. Income groups 
are classifi ed by adjusted gross income (AGI) as reported on tax forms. Income cutoff s 
denote the minimum AGI to be included in the group. Cumulative incomes denote the 
fraction of total U.S. AGI earned by members of the income group; similarly, cumula-
tive tax payments denote the fraction of total U.S. federal income tax payments by 
members of the group.
SOURCE: Dungan (2017).
Income Inequality, Progressive Taxation, and Tax Expenditures   151
gains; and various tax credits. Table 7.2 displays the largest federal tax 
expenditures for Fiscal Year 2016, with accompanying magnitudes of 
forgone federal tax revenue because of these tax expenditures. Many of 
these tax expenditures benefi t high-income taxpayers.
Table 7.3 presents the distribution of federal personal income tax 
expenditures by income group for Tax Year 2013. The fi rst column 
off ers evidence on tax exclusions, which consist of the benefi ts of the 
favorable tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance, pension 
contributions, and income; the favorable tax treatment of capital gains 
on assets held until death; and other smaller exclusions. As the table 
indicates, 7 percent of the aggregate value of these tax exclusions is 
enjoyed by taxpayers whose incomes are in the top 1 percent of the U.S. 
income distribution. While the aggregate value of these benefi ts for the 
top 1 percent is obviously disproportionate to the number of taxpayers, 
it is actually rather small compared to the roughly 39.5 percent of tax 




Exclusions from taxable income:
Employer contributions for health care and insurance 164.6
Employer pension contributions and earnings 156.1
Social Security and railroad retirement benefi ts 38.4
Capital gains at death 32.9
Interest on state and local government bonds 32.9 
Fringe benefi ts provided under cafeteria plans 31.3
Capital gains on sales of principal residences 29.2 
Tax deductions:
State and local income, sales, and property taxes 96.6
Mortgage interest on owner-occupied residences 59.0
Charitable contributions 55.2
Reduced tax rates on dividends and long-term capital gains 130.9
Tax credits:
Earned Income Tax Credit 73.0
Child Tax Credit 55.0
NOTE: The table presents the aggregate dollar values (in billions) of the largest indi-
vidual tax expenditure items for Fiscal Year 2016.
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2017a).
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payments (and 20.6 percent of income) accounted for by the top 1 per-
cent of taxpayers. Table 7.3 indicates that the top 20 percent of income 
earners in 2013 received 45 percent of the tax benefi ts from tax exclu-
sions—which, again, while disproportionate to that group’s numbers, is 
rather less than the share of this top-income quintile in tax payments or 
income. By contrast, taxpayers whose incomes are in the bottom two 
income quintiles received 15 percent of the aggregate tax benefi t of 
exclusions, which is a sizable benefi t considering that the bottom half 
of income earners has 11.3 percent of aggregate income and pays just 
3.5 percent of aggregate U.S. income taxes.
The second column of Table 7.3 presents information on the dis-
tribution of the benefi ts of tax deductions, which include benefi ts from 
deducting state and local taxes, mortgage interest payments, charita-
ble contributions, and other expenses. These benefi ts are more heavily 
concentrated among high-income taxpayers than are the benefi ts of tax 















Top 1 7 30 68 0 17
Top 20 45 81 93 3 51
60–80 23 13 5 12 18
40–60 16 4 2 19 13
20–40 10 1 0 29 10
Bottom 20 5 0 0 37 8
Table 7.3  Share of Tax Expenditures by Income Group, 2013
NOTE: Figures in the table report the fraction of total U.S. tax benefi ts of each tax 
preference category received by each of the designated income groups, as defi ned by 
adjusted gross income. “Tax exclusions” consist of tax benefi ts from the exclusion 
from taxable income of employer-provided health insurance, net pension contribu-
tions and earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, a portion of Social 
Security and railroad retirement benefi ts, and other items. “Tax deductions” consist of 
tax benefi ts from the itemized deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest, 
charitable contributions, and others. “Capital gains preferences” are the benefi ts of the 
preferential tax rates at which long-term gains are taxed. “Tax credits” consist of tax 
benefi ts from the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and other available 
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top 1 percent receive 30 percent of the aggregate benefi ts of tax deduc-
tions; income earners in the top quintile of the distribution receive 81 
percent of the aggregate benefi ts of tax deductions. These percentages 
correspond roughly to shares of aggregate tax payments. By contrast, 
income earners in the bottom quintile of the distribution receive only 
negligible benefi ts from tax deductions, refl ecting both the low tax 
rates against which they take deductions and the very small fraction of 
such taxpayers who itemize deductions rather than taking the standard 
deduction.
The third and fourth columns of Table 7.3 display information on 
distributions of the benefi ts of capital-gain preferences and tax credits. 
These two series exhibit very diff erent distributional properties. The 
benefi ts of capital-gain preferences—the low rates at which long-term 
capital gains are taxed—are very strongly concentrated among high-
income taxpayers, with the top quintile of income earners enjoying 
93 percent of the aggregate benefi t of these low tax rates, while the 
bottom two quintiles of income earners enjoy only negligible benefi ts. 
The opposite is true of the benefi ts of tax credits, which arise almost 
entirely from the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit. 
The bottom two quintiles of income earners enjoy 66 percent of the 
aggregate benefi ts of tax credits, whereas the top quintile of income 
earners receive only negligible benefi ts.
The fi fth column of Table 7.3 displays shares of aggregate benefi ts 
from all tax expenditures taken together. Because of the signifi cance of 
tax deductions and capital-gain preferences, aggregate tax expenditure 
benefi ts are again concentrated among high-income taxpayers, with 17 
percent accruing to the top 1 percent of taxpayers, and 51 percent to the 
top quintile. By contrast, the bottom quintile of income earners receives 
only 8 percent of the aggregate benefi ts of tax expenditures, and the 
20–40 percent quintile receives 10 percent of the aggregate benefi ts.
Table 7.4 presents information on the benefi ts of aggregate tax 
expenditures expressed as shares of after-tax incomes. This method of 
presenting the values of tax expenditures implicitly modifi es the entries 
to adjust for the dollar values of the benefi ts provided by diff erent types 
of tax expenditures. For example, since the aggregate dollar value of tax 
exclusions greatly exceeds the aggregate dollar value of tax deductions, 
the distribution of tax exclusions has greater impact on the fi nal distri-
bution of after-tax incomes than does the distribution of tax deductions. 
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Despite a normalization by after-tax incomes, it remains the case that 
the values of tax deductions and capital-gain preferences appear to be 
concentrated among high-income taxpayers: the top 1 percent receive 
benefi ts from tax deductions equal to 3.9 percent of their incomes, and 
they receive benefi ts from capital-gains preferences equal to 5.3 percent 
of their incomes. By contrast, taxpayers with incomes in the bottom 40 
percent of the income distribution receive benefi ts from tax deductions 
equal to just 0.2 percent of their incomes and receive only negligible 
benefi ts from capital gains preferences. The benefi ts of tax exclusions 
in Table 7.4 appear to be spread across the population roughly in pro-
portion to after-tax incomes, and the benefi ts of tax credits are very 
strongly concentrated among low-income taxpayers, with those in the 
bottom quintile of the income distribution receiving tax credits worth 
8.1 percent of their incomes. By contrast, taxpayers in the top quintile 
of the income distribution receive benefi ts from tax credits equal to just 


















Top 1 3.2 3.9 5.3 0.0 13.1
Top 20 4.7 2.5 1.7 0.1 9.4
60–80 5.2 0.8 0.2 0.7 7.3
40–60 5.0 0.4 0.1 1.5 7.3
20–40 4.5 0.2 0.0 3.3 7.9
Bottom 20 4.2 0.0 0.0 8.1 11.7
Table 7.4  Values of Tax Expenditures as Shares of After-Tax Income, by 
Income Group, 2013 (%)
NOTE: Figures in the table report values of total U.S. tax benefi ts of each tax preference 
category received by each of the designated income groups, expressed as fractions 
of group income. “Tax exclusions” consist of tax benefi ts from the exclusion from 
taxable income of employer-provided health insurance, net pension contributions and 
earnings, capital gains on assets transferred at death, a portion of Social Security and 
railroad retirement benefi ts, and other items. “Tax deductions” consist of tax benefi ts 
from the itemized deductions for state and local taxes, mortgage interest, charitable 
contributions, and others. “Capital gains preferences” are the benefi ts of the preferen-
tial tax rates at which long-term gains are taxed. “Tax credits” consist of tax benefi ts 
from the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and other available credits. 
“Total tax expenditures” is the sum of all of these tax benefi ts.
SOURCE: CBO (2013).
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The fi fth column of Table 7.4 presents the distribution of the dol-
lar values of tax expenditures measured as percentages of after-tax 
incomes. This distribution of benefi ts is largely fl at across the middle 
three quintiles of the income distribution, with somewhat greater den-
sity in the bottom and top quintiles, and a mild concentration of benefi ts 
for the top 1 percent of income earners.
The evidence indicates that taxpayers in the top 20 percent of the 
U.S. income distribution receive a majority of the benefi ts of tax expen-
ditures, from which many people quite understandably draw the con-
clusion that tax exclusions, deductions, and credits are antiprogressive. 
One problem with this inference is that existing tax expenditures off er 
benefi ts roughly in proportion to after-tax incomes, suggesting that they 
serve largely as factors that reduce eff ective tax rates by somewhat con-
stant amounts. The second problem is that evaluating tax expenditures 
in isolation relies on a view of the world in which everything else—
notably including tax rates—stays unchanged while tax preferences 
disappear. This is unrealistic; governments choose tax rates together 
with tax preferences, and if tax preferences were reduced in magnitude, 
then government would also change tax rates. Consequently, in order 
to know just what eff ect tax expenditures have on the distribution of 
income, it is necessary to understand the principles that governments 
apply in designing their tax systems. 
THE 2017 TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT
In December 2017, the United States enacted a major tax reform, 
commonly known by the bill’s original title, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(TCJA). This legislation was initially directed at reforming the U.S. 
system of corporate and international taxation, and while the TCJA did 
reduce the U.S. corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent and 
introduce major changes to the U.S. system of taxing foreign income, 
the fi nal bill also included signifi cant cuts to individual taxes and the 
taxation of income earned by unincorporated businesses. As a result, 
forecasts predicted that the TCJA would reduce federal revenue collec-
tions by $1.456 trillion over 10 years; and even in the scenario in which 
the tax reduction has the eff ect of stimulating the economy, federal rev-
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enues over that time period would decline by $1.071 trillion because of 
the bill’s provisions (Joint Committee on Taxation 2017b).
The 2017 legislation signifi cantly reduced individual taxes by low-
ering tax rates, almost doubling the standard deduction, doubling the 
Child Tax Credit, increasing the exempt amount under the individual 
alternative minimum tax (AMT), and making several other changes. 
There were also several provisions that increased individual taxes, nota-
bly by removing personal exemptions, reducing and eliminating several 
popular itemized deductions, and changing the method by which bracket 
amounts are indexed to infl ation. The combination of rate reductions 
and limits on itemized deductions produced a lower-rate, broader-based 
personal income tax system. It also produced a personal income tax 
system with burdens less well targeted to ability to pay.
The 2017 TCJA reduced average eff ective tax rates at every income 
level. Table 7.5 presents a distributional analysis of the eff ect of the 
TCJA, comparing tax burdens by income level in 2017 (prior to appli-
cation of the TCJA’s provisions) and 2019. As the table indicates, the 
TCJA reduced personal income taxes by $259.5 billion in 2019, low-
ering the average personal income tax rate from 20.7 percent to 19.0 
percent. The tax reductions were concentrated among higher-income 
taxpayers, in part refl ecting the reality that these individuals pay the 
majority of federal income taxes. The roughly 1.7 million taxpayers 
with incomes of $500,000 and above saw their aggregate federal taxes 
decline by $60.8 billion between 2017 and 2019, whereas the 37.5 mil-
lion taxpayers with incomes in the $20,000–$40,000 range received an 
aggregate tax reduction of just $8.4 billion.
The second and third columns of Table 7.5 present average tax rates 
in 2017 and 2019 for each of the listed income groups. Average tax rates 
declined for each of these groups by between 0.5 and 3.1 percent, with 
most of the large reductions materializing for high-income taxpayers. 
For example, the average tax rate of taxpayers with $1 million or more 
of income fell from 32.5 percent in 2017 to 30.2 percent in 2019; and 
the average tax rate of taxpayers with annual incomes in the $500,000 
to $1 million range declined from 30.9 percent in 2017 to 27.8 per-
cent in 2019. By contrast, the average tax rate of taxpayers with annual 
incomes in the $20,000–$30,000 range fell by only 0.5 percent, from 
3.9 percent to 3.4 percent. As a result, the 2017 TCJA delivered its larg-
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est tax reductions (as measured relative to pretax incomes) to the most 
affl  uent taxpayers.
Table 7.6 explores the sources of tax burden changes for aff ected 
taxpayer income groups. Entries in the table represent the aggregate 
magnitudes of tax reductions between 2017 and 2019 for which the 
listed tax bill provisions were responsible. Thus, for example, the tax 
rate reductions in the 2017 bill lowered by $57.8 billion the aggregate 
2019 tax liabilities of taxpayers in the $200,000–$500,000 income 
group. The same taxpayer group also received $23.8 billion in aggre-
gate tax savings from the 2017 bill’s signifi cant reduction in the alterna-
tive minimum tax but paid an additional $25.8 billion in aggregate taxes 
because of the removal of personal exemptions.
Some patterns are evident from the information in Table 7.6. The 
tax rate reductions in the 2017 bill reduced aggregate 2019 tax col-
lections by $198.4 billion, with the benefi ts concentrated among high-
income taxpayers. The 2017 bill reduced aggregate tax collections 









Less than 10 0.4 9.1 8.6 19.3 
10–20 1.8 −0.7 −1.2 20.6
20–30 3.0 3.9 3.4 21.5
30–40 5.4 7.9 7.0 16.0
40–50 6.7 10.9 9.9 12.8
50–75 23.0 14.8 13.5 27.4
75–100 22.4 17.0 15.6 17.8
100–200 70.4 20.9 19.4 30.7
200–500 65.5 26.4 23.9 9.2
500–1,000 23.9 30.9 27.8 1.1
1,000 and over 36.9 32.5 30.2 0.6
Total 259.5 20.7 19.0 177.0 
Table 7.5  2019 Distributional Eff ects of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
NOTE: The table presents the aggregate tax reductions between 2017 and 2019, and the 
average federal income tax rates in 2017 and 2019, for 11 income groups classifi ed by 
adjusted gross income as reported on tax forms.  
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2019).
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tax reduction was enjoyed by taxpayers in the $200,000-to-$1-million 
income range. The elimination of personal exemptions increased aggre-
gate tax liabilities by $127.1 billion, most of it paid by taxpayers earn-
ing between $100,000 and $500,000, and virtually none of which paid 
by taxpayers earning $500,000 or above (whose personal exemptions 
had been already largely phased out under pre-2018 law). Increasing 
the standard deduction reduced total tax collections by $109.5 billion, 
and almost 70 percent of these benefi ts were received by taxpayers 























Less than 10 0.0 1 m −1 m 182 m 0 82 m
10–20 0.0 4 m −932 m 3.3 b −4 m 1.0 b
20–30 0.3 0 m −2.8 b 5.9 b −60 m 2.4 b
30–40 1.3 2 m −3.8 b 7.0 b −153 m 3.5 b
40–50 2.7 6 m −4.9 b 7.7 b −231 m 4.3 b
50–75 12.3 9 m −16.5 b 20.4 b −1.1 b 9.8 b
75–100 14.7 9 m −17.7 b 16.8 b −1.7 b 7.7 b
100–200 61.1 690 m −54.6 b 37.2 b −9.1 b 23.9 b
200–500 57.8 23.8 b −25.8 b 9.6 b −21.5 b 13.5 b
500–1,000 18.6 13.2 b −39 m 1.1 b −12.3 b 93 m
1,000 and 
over
29.5 873 m −1 m 425 m −30.0 b 0
Total 198.4 38.6 b −127.1 b 109.5 b −$76.2 b 66.4 b
Table 7.6  2019 Distributional Eff ects of Specifi c Provisions of the 2017 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
NOTE: The table presents the aggregate tax reductions between 2017 and 2019 due to 
various provisions of the 2017 TCJA, distinguished by income groups as classifi ed 
by adjusted gross income reported on tax forms. The fi rst column reports tax reduc-
tions due to lower tax rates introduced by the TCJA. The second column reports tax 
reductions due to changes in the alternative minimum tax. The third column reports 
tax reductions (all of which are negative, so therefore correspond to tax increases) 
that are due to the elimination of personal exemptions. The fourth column reports tax 
reductions due to increases in the standard deduction. The fi fth column reports tax 
reductions (all of which are negative, so therefore correspond to tax increases) that 
are due to limitations on itemized deductions. The sixth column reports tax reductions 
due to increases in the Child Tax Credit.
SOURCE: Joint Committee on Taxation (2019).
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Credit reduced total tax collections by $66.4 billion, with the benefi ts 
concentrated among taxpayers with middle-to-high incomes; those with 
incomes below $20,000 or above $500,000 received almost none of the 
benefi ts.
The 2017 legislation made several changes to itemized deduc-
tions, limiting the ability of taxpayers to claim deductions for state and 
local tax payments, mortgage interest payments, casualty losses, mov-
ing expenses, alimony payments, and various miscellaneous itemized 
deductions, including expenses incurred in income-earning activities. 
In total, these restrictions reduced tax collections by $76.2 billion, with 
the burden heavily concentrated among high-income taxpayers. For 
example, these limits on itemized deductions increased by $30.0 bil-
lion the aggregate tax liabilities of taxpayers with incomes of $1 mil-
lion or more, despite the relatively small number of such taxpayers; by 
contrast, taxpayers with incomes below $100,000 (who itemize their 
deductions at relatively low rates) were largely unaff ected.
Those who have long advocated for broad-based, low-rate income 
taxation got a version of what they asked for with the 2017 Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act. The 2017 TCJA reduced rates and removed deductions 
and exemptions, moving federal income taxation in the direction of 
a fl atter—and some would argue, simpler—tax system. The federal 
income tax now collects less money than it would have absent the 2017 
changes and does so in a manner that corresponds less to assigning 
burdens according to ability to pay. While the individual income tax 
features of the 2017 legislation move the federal revenue system in an 
unfortunate direction according to these criteria, one way in which the 
2017 TCJA is useful is that it illustrates what direction not to take in 
crafting more wholesale reforms to the tax system.
PRINCIPLES OF INCOME TAXATION
Countries impose taxes in order to raise revenue to fi nance their 
governments. The cost of raising revenue is that the accompanying 
taxes impose burdens on individuals and businesses that pay the taxes, 
and these taxes also impose costs on the economy as a whole by dis-
torting economic incentives. Income taxation discourages income pro-
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duction, thereby reducing the effi  ciency of the economy and running 
counter to most government objectives. The economic costs of the 
distortions produced by income taxation almost always rise with the 
amount of revenue collected,4 and with the extent of tax progressivity, 
so a more distortionary tax system puts downward pressure on govern-
ment spending and on the extent to which a government will be willing 
to impose progressive taxes.
The cost of economic distortions is a function of the degree to 
which price distortions discourage and alter economic activity. Prop-
erly designed income exclusions, tax deductions, and tax credits make 
the tax system less distortionary by directing tax burdens at economic 
activities that are less responsive to taxation. For example, while all 
income taxes discourage labor supply, the eff ects are more dramatic in 
some instances, and for some groups of workers, than they are for oth-
ers. Age is an obvious dimension along which the labor supply eff ects 
of taxation will usually diff er. For example, workers over 60 years old 
are at far greater risk of retiring than are workers in their forties, so 
high tax rates are much more likely to drive older workers out of the 
labor force than they are to induce exit by middle-aged workers. Con-
sequently, an effi  cient tax system would off er preferential treatment of 
older workers, all other things being equal. And if a tax system does not 
off er special exemptions, deductions, or tax credits to elderly workers, 
then the labor supply responsiveness of this group will put downward 
pressure on income tax rates in general, since the government will know 
that higher tax rates signifi cantly reduce the labor supply of a signifi cant 
portion of the population.
Similar considerations apply to the tax treatment of working fami-
lies with young children. Since children require care and supervision, 
parents who work full time must incur out-of-pocket child-care costs, 
many of which are avoidable if at least one of the parents were to stay 
home with the children. High tax rates on working parents discour-
age labor force participation by reducing the net return from work-
ing—which has particularly strong eff ects on income production by 
parents of young children. The tax system can address this problem 
most directly by providing tax deductions or tax credits for child-care 
expenses incurred to accommodate the careers of working parents, 
which has the eff ect of more nearly taxing the net economic return to 
working. While the U.S. tax system currently off ers modest versions of 
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these deductions and credits, they are very much incomplete, which is 
why high tax rates on labor income would strongly discourage parental 
labor-force participation.
Certain forms of capital income are similarly sensitive to taxation. 
Capital gains off er an important example. Capital gains are taxed on 
realization rather than accrual, so high rates of capital income taxa-
tion strongly discourage owners of appreciated assets from selling their 
holdings, a phenomenon known as the “lock-in eff ect.” Owners of 
homes, shares of stock, small businesses, and other valuable properties 
commonly retain their holdings far longer than they would otherwise 
want to, in order to delay triggering capital gains taxes. By delaying 
realizations, an owner implicitly earns returns on the taxes that are not 
paid in the meantime. To the extent that capital income taxes apply to 
capital gains, these taxes distort the economy by keeping homeowners 
in homes they no longer want, investors in shares of companies they 
no longer want to hold, and business owners in businesses they would 
prefer to sell to others. Furthermore, anticipation of these taxes discour-
ages investments in the fi rst place. The reality that capital-gains tax 
realizations are highly sensitive to taxation accounts for the favorable 
tax treatment that the federal income tax currently aff ords to income 
from long-term capital gains. In the absence of such favorable treat-
ment, there would be very strong downward pressure on income tax 
rates, as governments recognize that the lock-in eff ect makes high rates 
very costly.
The examples of the eff ects of high tax rates on labor supply by 
elderly workers, labor supply by working parents, and capital gains real-
izations, are just that: examples. In fact, there are scores of dimensions 
along which economic activity is more and less responsive to taxation, 
and which therefore from an effi  ciency standpoint justify favorable tax 
treatment of certain taxpayers and activities, and less favorable treat-
ment of others. In the absence of such tax diff erentiation, the system 
becomes less effi  cient and more costly, which makes governments less 
willing to impose the high tax rates necessary to fund signifi cant gov-
ernment operations and to do so in a progressive manner.
The effi  ciency considerations that argue in favor of an extensive 
system of tax preferences in the form of exclusions, deductions, and 
credits simply add to traditional equity considerations. Taxpayers in 
diff erent situations, and with diff erent forms of income, have diff ering 
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abilities to pay taxes, and therefore should be subject to taxation at dif-
ferent rates. Children again off er an obvious example. A married couple 
with labor income of $80,000 is clearly in a diff erent economic position 
from a family consisting of a married couple and fi ve children with a 
family income of $80,000, and it is obvious that the childless couple has 
in a very practical sense greater real income and therefore greater abil-
ity to pay taxes. The U.S. tax system off ers only very modest benefi ts 
to families with children and would need to do much more in order to 
adjust properly for the eff ect of family size on taxpaying ability. Failure 
to adjust taxes properly for family size means not only that tax bur-
dens are inequitably distributed between taxpaying families, but also 
that there is downward pressure on tax rates in general, since high tax 
rates without proper adjustments for family size would impose severe 
burdens on families in certain circumstances.
Casualty losses off er another example. A family whose home burns 
down or whose car is stolen incurs signifi cant economic losses in addi-
tion to life disruption, insofar as any losses are uninsured. There is a 
very real sense in which the family’s economic income in the year of 
the incident is lower by the amount of the uninsured loss; and an unin-
sured loss certainly diminishes a family’s ability to pay federal income 
taxes without incurring signifi cant economic hardship. Until 2018, it 
was possible for U.S. taxpayers to claim deductions for casualty losses 
to the extent that such losses exceeded 10 percent of adjusted gross 
income, but provisions of the 2017 TCJA all but eliminated this deduc-
tion. The result is not only the serious inequity that follows from sub-
jecting people to taxation based on inaccurate measures of their annual 
incomes, but also downward pressure on tax rates, to prevent federal 
income taxes from imposing signifi cant hardship on families incurring 
casualty losses and other major economic disruptions.
There are many other dimensions along which the economic situ-
ations of taxpaying families diff er, and which bear on their ability to 
pay federal taxes. Families incur medical and educational expenses, job 
disruptions, investment reversals, loan demands from friends and rela-
tives, and many other circumstances that could be reasonably accom-
modated by provisions in the tax system. It is a reality that tax breaks 
given to one group of taxpayers must be made up by higher burdens on 
other taxpayers, but fortunately there is a simple legislative method of 
performing such an adjustment, which is to increase tax rates. 
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INCOME TAXATION
A properly designed income tax off ers many exclusions, deductions, 
and credits that accommodate individual situations and thereby adjust 
tax burdens according to ability to pay. Such a system also imposes 
relatively heavier burdens on income sources that are least responsive 
to taxation. These features give the tax system a narrow base and rela-
tively high rates. The high rates are indeed important attributes: a tax 
system that imposes burdens in accordance with ability to pay has tax 
rates that rise sharply with income, making the tax-rate schedule highly 
progressive.
Under any circumstance, it is in the national interest to adopt an 
income tax that imposes burdens according to ability to pay, but at a 
time of heightened concern over the distribution of income there is even 
greater need to adhere to sound principles in crafting income tax provi-
sions. Sound tax design addresses income distribution concerns in sev-
eral ways. The fi rst is by accommodating individual circumstances and 
needs, implicitly adjusting tax burdens for diff erences in real incomes. 
The second way in which sound tax design addresses income distribu-
tion concerns is by facilitating the imposition of a highly progressive 
tax-rate schedule, one in which high-income taxpayers shoulder much 
more of the tax burden than do low-income taxpayers. And the third 
way is that sound tax design makes it feasible to fi nance signifi cant 
government expenditures at a reasonable cost, which makes it possible 
for the government to adopt spending measures that assist low-income 
and otherwise vulnerable portions of the population.
The United States already has a progressive personal income tax, 
and it already permits many exclusions, deductions, and tax credits that 
narrow the base and, to a degree, adjust tax burdens to individual situ-
ations. These features of the income tax are widely criticized, notably 
by advocates for greater tax progressivity, who feel that higher-income 
taxpayers receive most of the benefi ts of exclusions, deductions, and 
tax credits. Evidence from tax fi lings confi rms that this observation 
is largely correct: high-income taxpayers do indeed benefi t from tax 
expenditures, with slightly more than half of the benefi ts going to peo-
ple in the top quintile of the income distribution, and just 8 percent of 
the benefi ts going to people in the bottom quintile.
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It is a mistake to conclude from this observation, as so many have, 
that the answer to making the tax system more progressive lies in selec-
tive reductions in tax expenditures. On the contrary: in order to make 
the tax system more progressive, it is necessary to expand signifi cantly 
the number of tax expenditures, particularly those that benefi t high-
income taxpayers. The tax-rate schedule can be made more progressive 
only by adjusting the taxation of high-income earners for aspects of 
their economic activities and personal situations that bear on their abil-
ity and willingness to pay taxes. Put simply, with diff erent design, it is 
possible to impose higher tax rates on those with high incomes—but 
this design will certainly entail signifi cant tax breaks for some with high 
incomes. The tax system can thereby do much more to align tax burdens 
with abilities to pay, and to relieve burdens on those who are struggling 
economically—but such a system lies open to critique by well-meaning 
critics who do not appreciate the connection between the breadth of the 
tax base and the progressivity of tax rates.
Recent legislative developments are far from encouraging. The 2017 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act gave the tax system a narrower base and lower 
rates, reducing its progressivity and also reducing total tax collections. 
In eliminating or restricting tax deductions for casualty losses, alimony 
payments, moving expenses, state and local income tax payments, 
mortgage interest payments, and expenses incurred in income-earning 
activities, the 2017 TCJA signifi cantly reduced the extent to which tax 
burdens align with ability to pay. The tax-rate reductions enacted by the 
TCJA simply add to the mismatch between tax burdens and taxpaying 
ability, and the reduced tax collections make it ever more diffi  cult to 
maintain government programs directed at those in challenging eco-
nomic circumstances. The TCJA was the product of a political process 
driven by many considerations, but underlying some of the changes that 
it enacted was a mistaken sense that a broad-based, low-rate income tax 
is better than the alternative. Certainly this is not the case if one desires 
a tax that imposes burdens according to ability to pay and does so in 
a progressive manner. But even if one’s goal is merely effi  ciency, not 
equity or progressivity, a good tax system is highly diff erentiated, off er-
ing multiple exclusions, deductions, and credits.
It is important not to overlook effi  ciency in designing a tax sys-
tem, whether or not analysts and advocates are motivated by a desire 
to distribute tax burdens equitably. A more effi  cient tax system off ers 
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greater opportunity to pursue all objectives, including those related to 
equity; and in particular, a more effi  cient tax system can support a more 
progressive tax rate structure at lower cost than does a less effi  cient 
tax system. In addition, a more effi  cient tax system makes it feasible 
for the government to fi nance worthwhile expenditures, including those 
that may have redistributive eff ects. Properly crafted tax expenditures 
enhance the effi  ciency of the tax system by directing tax burdens to 
where they have the least eff ect of discouraging income production, 
thereby making the economy more productive.
Postwar U.S. history includes long stretches of time over which tax 
rates were high and the tax system off ered extensive exclusions, deduc-
tions, and tax credits. The recent movement has been in the opposite 
direction, and to little good eff ect from the standpoints of aligning tax 
burdens with ability to pay and fi nancing the U.S. government. Those 
inclined to criticize tax breaks as giveaways to the rich might do well 
to refl ect on the alternative, which is a stripped-down tax system with 
relatively fl at rates and little if any accommodation for the needs of 
individual taxpayers. In fact, the tax system needs more of what it once 
had, with high tax rates but also extensive tax preferences for certain 
types of income and taxpayers in specifi ed circumstances. Only then 
will it be possible to address the income distribution concerns, and the 
government fi nancing concerns, that properly motivate those interested 
in contemporary U.S. economic policy.
Notes
 1. See, for example, Pechman (1977), Century Foundation Working Group (2002), 
Reid (2017), and Sarin and Summers (2019).
 2. In tax year 2015, 44.6 million U.S. tax returns itemized deductions out of 
150.5 million returns fi led, representing 29.6 percent of the total.  These and 
other tax-return data are available at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats
-individual-income-tax-return-form-1040-statistics.
 3. The Congressional Budget Offi  ce (CBO 2019) reports that, in 2018, total U.S. 
federal government revenues were $3,329 billion, of which $1,684 billion (50.6 
percent) represented individual income taxes, and $1,171 billion (35.2 percent) 
were payroll taxes.
 4. Atkinson and Stern (1974) identify exceptional cases in which higher tax revenues 
can be associated with reduced economic distortions; see Dahlby (2008) for a 
review of this literature.
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